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TIMPANOGOS TRIBE V. CONWAY: FISHING FOR AN
EXCEPTION TO STATE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY IN
NATURAL RESOURCE REGULATION

"At times, we did not have enough to eat and we were not
allowed to hunt. All we wanted was peace and to be let
alone."
-Crazy Horse of the Sioux

I.

INTRODUCTION

The land and its natural resources have always played an integral role in the lives of Native Americans.' Hunting and fishing on
tribal reservations provide tribes with more than just food; such activities often carry religious symbolism as well. 2 Throughout the
history of the United States, Native Americans have enjoyed a high
degree of sovereignty over the lands they occupy.3
In recent years, environmental groups have questioned unregulated tribal dominion over hunting and fishing resources, arguing
that state and federal regulations that protect wildlife should apply
to tribes. 4 These groups have ignited public debate about the regulation of natural resources on Indian reservations.5 In addition,
states claiming authority to regulate natural resources within state

boundaries have clashed with tribes claiming sovereignty over natu1. See, Laurie Reynolds, Indian Hunting and Fishing Rights: The Role of Tribal
Sovereignty and Preemption, 62 N.C. L. REv. 743, 743 (1984) (citing central role of
land and its resources in lives of Native Americans).
2. See, Carl H. Johnson, BalancingSpecies Protection with Tribal Sovereignty: What
Does the Tribal Rights-EndangeredSpecies Order Accomplish?, 83 MINN. L. REv. 523, 525
(1998) (stating numerous species of plants and animals are spiritually and culturally significant for Indian tribes).
3. See Reynolds, supra note 1, at 743 (discussing source and scope of Indian
sovereignty). For a discussion of the historical development of Native American
sovereignty, see infra note 32 and accompanying text.
4. See, Johnson, supra note 2, at 526 (discussing balance between Endangered
Species Act [hereinafter ESA] and tribal sovereignty). For a discussion fo the current relationship between environmental groups and Native American tribes, see
infra notes 72-81 and accompanying text.
5. See David Rich Lewis, Native Americans and the Environment: A Survey of Twentieth Century Issues, 19 AMER. INDIAN Q. 423 (1995), availableat http://www.cpluhna.
nau.edu/Research/native_americans4htm (discussing hunting and fishing rights
of Native Americans and interaction with environment).
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ral resources within the boundaries of their reservations. 6 This
clash has spawned lawsuits, as courts attempt to draw a line between
tribal rights and state rights. 7 Tribes have faced complications

when they seek to sue a state in federal court; often, the Eleventh
Amendment of the Constitution will bar such an action.8 This restriction is not absolute, and courts have made exceptions, particularly when the suit is brought against a state official instead of the
state generally.9
In Timpanogos Tribe v. Conway' ° the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the Eleventh Amendment did not bar a tribe's suit
against a state official for declaratory relief from Utah's hunting
and fishing regulations." This Note examines the validity of that
holding in light of recent Supreme Court jurisprudence concerning the Eleventh Amendment.' 2 Part II of this Note summarizes
the facts involved in Timpanogos Tribe.' 3 Part III provides background information about tribal hunting and fishing rights, the
conflict between environmental groups and tribes, and Eleventh
Amendment issues when tribes try to sue states.' 4 Part IV analyzes
the Tenth Circuit's reasoning in the case.15 Part V suggests that the
6. See id. (discussing apparent conflict between state laws and tribes); see also
Joe W. Stuckey, Tribal Nations: Environmentally More Sovereign than States, 31 ENVTL.
L. REP. 11198 (Oct. 2001) (noting jurisdictional conflict between states and tribes
with respect to environmental regulations).
7. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172
(1999) (holding treaty rights reconcilable with state sovereignty over natural resources); see also United States v. Washington, 694 F.2d 1374 (9th Cir. 1982) (addressing off-reservation treaty rights between tribes and state). For other examples
of lawsuits between tribes and states, see generally 41 AM. JuR. 2D Indians § 64
(2002).
8. U.S. CONST. amend. XI. The Eleventh Amendment of the Constitution
states: "The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend
to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United
States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State."
Id. The Supreme Court held that the protection of the Eleventh Amendment did
not extend to Indian Tribes in Blatchford v. Village of Noatak. 501 U.S. 775, 782
(1991).
9. See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 163 (1908) (holding suit against state
official not barred if prospective relief is sought).
10. 286 F.3d 1195 (10th Cir. 2002).
11. See id. at 1205 (holding Ex parte Young applicable, and action not barred
by Eleventh Amendment).
12. For a discussion of current Supreme Court decisions that seem to limit
the application of Ex parte Young, see infra notes 107-22 and accompanying text.
13. For a discussion of the facts of Timpanogos Tribe, see infra notes 18-28 and

accompanying text.
14. For a discussion of the scope of treaty rights, environmental conflicts and
the Eleventh Amendment, see infra Part Ill.
15. For a discussion of the Tenth Circuit's reasoning in the case, see infra
notes 123-34 and accompanying text.
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Tenth Circuit's reasoning failed to adequately address the additional Eleventh Amendment restrictions imposed by the Supreme
Court's 1997 decision in Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene.1 6 Finally, Part VI
argues that, by declining to consider the full impact of the Eleventh
Amendment on tribal natural resource litigation, the Tenth Circuit
missed an opportunity to consider the degree to which 17a state's environmental regulation may trump tribal treaty rights.
II.

FACTS

The Timpanogos Tribe Snake Band of Shoshone Indians
(Tribe) occupies the Uintah Valley Reservation in Utah. 1 8 An 1864
treaty between the Tribe and the Federal government granted the
Tribe the right to hunt, fish and gather on the reservation, free
from state regulation. 19 Since then, the Utah State Division of
Wildlife Resources has imposed regulations prohibiting the hunting of elk and deer without proper state-issued licenses. 20 Tribal
members hunt with tribe-issued licenses. 21 In the summer of 2000,
state officials threatened criminal prosecution against anyone not
22
using a state-issued license to hunt or fish.

In August of 2000, the Tribe brought suit in the District Court
of Utah against Kevin Conway, Assistant Director of the Utah Department of Natural Resources, as well as Utah Governor Michael
Leavitt. 23 The suit sought injunctive relief from state licensing regulations and declaratory relief stating "that Messrs. Conway and
Leavitt have no authority to regulate or control the hunting, fishing, or gathering rights of the Timpanogos Tribe on Indian lands
within the Reservation."

24

16. 521 U.S. 261 (1997).
17. For a discussion of what some feel is an alarming trend in the Court's
reading of the Eleventh Amendment, see Sharon Buccino et al., Hostile Environment: How Activist Judges Threaten Our Air, Water, and Land, An Environmental Report
on Judicial Selection, Natural Resources Defense Council (July 2001), available at

http://www.nrdc.org/legislation/hostile/hostile.pdf.

Buccino argues that the

Eleventh Amendment has been twisted in recent years to excuse state compliance

with federal environmental laws. Id. at vi.
18. See Timpanogos Tribe v. Conway, 286 F.3d 1195, 1198 (10th Cir. 2002) (identifying geographic location of Tribe).
19. See id. at 1199 (describing terms of Treaty of 1864).
20. SeeJacob Santini, State Still Can't Charge Tribal Hunters, SALT LAKE TRIB.,

Apr. 16, 2002, at D2 (discussing state-imposed regulations for hunting).

21. See id. (noting lack of state licensing for tribal members).
22. See id. (noting threat of prosecution for those hunting without state
license).
23. See Timpanogos Tribe, 286 F.3d at 1198 (noting suit participants).
24. Id. at 1199 (stating language of allegations against defendants).
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State officials filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the Eleventh Amendment's prohibition against suits by citizens of a state
barred the suit. 25 The District Court for the District of Utah denied

the motion to dismiss on the grounds of Eleventh Amendment im6
munity, and the state officials brought this interlocutory appealY
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the Eleventh Amendment did not bar the suit because the suit falls within the exception
to sovereign immunity. 27 This exception allows suits against state
28
officials seeking prospective declaratory or injunctive relief
III.

A.

BACKGROUND

Tribal Sovereignty of Hunting and Fishing Rights

Native Americans have long possessed an aboriginal right to
29
occupy the land they inhabited before European encroachment.
The preservation of that right emanated from treaties made between tribes and the federal government, where the government
agreed to respect the sovereignty of the tribes. 30 Treaty rights are
legally binding against the federal government and, based on the
3
Supremacy Clause of the Constitution, are superior to state law. '
Treaty rights extend to hunting and fishing on aboriginal
lands, free from any governmental interference, unless the federal
government chooses to extinguish those rights. 3 2 Congress, how25. See id. (noting five issues tinder which suit should be dismissed).
26. See id. (stating reason for denying motion). The Tenth Circuit reviewed
the requirements for an interlocutory appeal and determined that, while normally,
courts of appeal exercise jurisdiction only over final decisions of the district courts,
there are exceptions. See id. "It is well-established that orders denying individual
officials' claims of absolute and qualified immunity are among those that may be
immediately appealed." Id.
27. See id. at 1206 (stating Tenth Circuit's decision to affirm district court's
decision).
28. See Timpanogos 7ribe, 286 F.3d at 1206 (describing exception to sovereign
immunity).
29. See Reynolds, supra note 1, at 744 (discussing source and scope of Indian
hunting and fishing rights).
30. See Elizabeth Roat, Analyzing Conflicts Between Indian Treaty Rights and Federal Conservation Regulations: Are State Regulation StandardsAppropriate?, 84 MARQ. L.
REV. 701, 704 (2001) (discussing foundations of Indian law).
31. See id. (noting that treaties with tribes have same status as treaties with
foreign nations). The Supremacy Clause states that the United States Constitution
is the supreme law of the land. See U.S. CONST. art. VI.
32. See Reynolds, supra note 1, at 745. (discussing when government may abrogate rights). Congress may abrogate treaty rights but is reluctant to do so in the
absence of an explicit statement, claiming that hunting and fishing rights are important property rights that may be exercised free from government interference.
See id. at 755. Deference to Indian sovereignty springs from the historical relationship between the federal government and tribes. See id. For a discussion of the
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ever, is reluctant to abrogate treaty rights because they are viewed as
property rights running with the land.33 Hunting and fishing rights

can be granted explicitly by treaty, or they can be inferred from
"oral or implied agreement that the tribes could continue to hunt
and fish on areas over which they had relinquished their aboriginal
title. '34 In addition, hunting and fishing rights may extend to offreservation sites if the site is necessary for tribal livelihood. 35 The
right to fish and hunt extends only to Native American groups who
have maintained tribal status, but federal recognition of the tribe is
36
not required as a condition of exercising treaty rights.

It is evident that "Indians enjoy exclusive treaty rights to hunt
and fish on lands reserved to them. ' 37 Although tribal hunting and
fishing rights appear unlimited, tribes accept responsibility to regulate on-reservation hunting and fishing activities of their members. 38 To achieve that goal, "various tribes have adopted game and
wildlife codes that control the time, place, and manner of member
hunting and fishing." 39 Tribal courts maintain jurisdiction over vio40
lations of these codes.

development of the federal trust responsibility relationship, see Nell Jessup
Newton, FederalPower Over Indians: Its Source, Scope and Limitations, 132 U. PA. L.
REV. 195 (1984). Newton discusses the development of the trust relationship between the federal government and Indian tribes, where the federal government
viewed the relationship as similar to that between a guardian and ward. See id. at
204. In addition, from the earliest point in the nation's history, the courts have
deferred to Congress's authority to regulate tribes under the "plenary powers" doctrine. See id. at 196. For a general discussion of the relationship between tribes
and the federal government, see 41 AM.JUR. 2D Indians § 5 (2002).
33. See Roat, supra note 30, at 705 (discussing reluctance of Congress to abrogate treaty rights). Abrogation of treaty rights must be based on clear evidence
from Congress that it intended to do so. See id.
34. See Reynolds, supra note 1, at 746 (explaining how hunting and fishing
rights may be granted).
35. See id. at 750-51 (referring to Court's interpretation of when off-site hunting is permissible). Courts will look to such factors as "reasonable livelihood expectations" to decide whether off-site fishing or hunting is permissible. Id. at 751.
36. See id. at 754 (noting that federal recognition not prerequisite to vitality of
treaty rights).
37. 41 AM. JUR. 2D Indians § 64 (2001). Hunting and fishing rights are valid
whether or not they were expressly mentioned in the treaty, unless these rights
have clearly been relinquished by treaty or modified by Congress. See id.
38. See Reynolds, supra note 1, at 759-60 (recognizing undisputed right of
tribe to regulate members' hunting and fishing rights).
39. Id. at 760. In addition, tribes have jurisdiction over non-members who
attempt to hunt or fish on the reservation based on their sovereignty over reservation lands. See id. at 761.
40. See id. at 760 (stating that violations of tribal codes are subject to criminal
jurisdiction of tribal courts).
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State Regulation of Hunting and Fishing on the Reservation

A basic premise of state sovereignty is a state's ability to regulate in the interest of the health and safety of its citizens. 4 1 This
includes environmental regulations. 42 It is equally true, however,
that "[a] Ithough the state normally enjoys great latitude in regulating the management of game and wildlife, its police power is reduced significantly when treaty rights are implicated. '41 Generally,
states may not regulate a tribe's right to hunt and fish within the
boundaries of a reservation. 44 In recent years, courts have reevaluated that premise, balancing a tribe's sovereignty in the area of
hunting and fishing against the state's interest in protecting natural
45
resources.
In 1977, the Supreme Court announced a "conservation necessity exception" to the rule that states may not regulate tribal hunting and fishing rights in Puyallup Tribe v. Department of Game of State
of Washington (Puyallup Ill).46 This case was preceded by two other
Puyallup decisions (PuyallupIand Puyallup I) that sought to specify
when fishing treaty rights may be abrogated in favor of state regulations. 47 In the Puyallup litigation, the State of Washington enacted a
fishing regulation that restricted the number of steelhead trout that
Puyallup Indians could catch by net both on and off the reservation. 48 In addition, tribal members had to file a report with the
State Department of Game, listing members who were eligible to
41. See U.S. CONST. amend. X. The Tenth Amendment states "the powers not
delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the
States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." Id. This Amendment has been interpreted to give states control over health and welfare concerns
of its citizens. See, e.g.,
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (holding
state legislation regulating violent crime, family law, and divorce, as "traditional
state regulation" under Tenth Amendment).
42. See, e.g., Puyallup Tribe v. Dep't of Game of State of Wash., 391 U.S. 392,
398 (1968) [hereinafter Puyallup I], (recognizing interest of state to regulate natural resources).
43. Reynolds, supra note 1, at 770 (stating that government regulation is diminished when treaty rights are implicated).
44. See 41 AM. JUR. 2D Indians § 64 (2002) (discussing rights of tribes to hunt
and fish within reservation boundaries); see also Reynolds, supra note I at 743 (discussing tribal sovereignty to hunt and fish on reserved lands).
45. See Reynolds, supra note 1, at 766 (arguing tribal sovereignty is limited by
federal recognition of rights).
46. 433 U.S. 165 (1977) [hereinafter Puyallup II].
47. See 391 U.S. 392 (1968); see also 414 U.S. 44 (1973). In Puyallup J, the
Court held that a state court may exercise jurisdiction over the rights of a tribal
member of a federally recognized tribe. See Puyallup 1, 391 U.S. at 398. In Puyallup
I, the Court directed a fair apportionment of steelhead trout between tribal and
non-tribal members. See Puyallup II, 414 U.S. at 48-9.
48. See Puyallup I, 433 U.S. at 167 (discussing Washington State regulation).
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fish, along with the number of fish caught each week. 49 The Puyallup brought suit, arguing that its sovereign authority over reserva50
tion lands prohibited the state from imposing such a regulation.
In particular, the Puyallup argued that the Treaty of Medicine
Creek granted the Tribe the right to fish unencumbered by state
regulation. 5' State officials argued, however, that the fishing rights
were shared with other state citizens, making them subject to state
regulation.5 2 The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the State, holding that the right to fish "was subject to reasonable regulation by
the state pursuant to its power to conserve an important natural
resource." 53 The Court recognized that, in this instance, the police
power of the state extended to protect the steelhead trout from possible extinction.

54

While Puyallup III enunciated the "conservation exception,"
Puyallup I determined which conservation regulations may validly
abrogate treaty rights. 55 Such a determination is based on a three-

part inquiry. 56 The Court stated that the fishing rights at issue
"may be regulated by the State [1] in the interest of conservation,
[2] provided the regulation meets appropriate standards and [3]

57
does not discriminate against the Indians."

The first inquiry focuses on whether the actual conservation
measure is necessary.58 Under this inquiry, the Court held that the
49. See id. (discussing particulars of fishing regulation).
50. See id. (describing Tribe's theory of sovereign authority).
51. See id. at 174-75 (citing treaty language). Specifically, Article III of the
treaty provides that "the right of taking fish, at all usual and accustomed grounds
and stations, is further secured to said Indians in common with all citizens of the
Territory." TREATY OF MEDICINE CREEK, Art. III, available at http://www.geocities.
com/puyallup-tribe-ofLindians/treaty.html (last visited Jan. 2, 2003).
52. See Puyallup Ii, 433 U.S. at 175. The Court agreed with Washington State
and held that fair apportionment between tribal members and non-Indian
sportsmen would be impossible if the Tribe were permitted to take an unlimited
number of fish from the reservation portion of the river. See id.
53. Id. (refusing to re-examine unanimous decisions of Puyallup I and 1/).
54. See id. (recognizing that police power extends to fishing regulations). In
Puyallup III, the Court quoted from Puyallup If for support of its holding: "Mr.
Justice Douglas plainly stated that: 'Rights can be controlled by the need to conserve a species ... the Treaty does not give the Indians a federal right to pursue
the last living steelhead until it enters their nets."' Id. at 175-76 (quoting Puyallup
II, 414 U.S. 44, 49 (1973)).
55. See Roat, supra note 30, at 706 (discussing treaty conflict analysis).
56. See Puyallup I, 391 U.S. 392, 398 (1968) (describing proper inquiry for
determining when conservation exception applies).
57. Id. (stating fishing rights at issue to be manner of fishing, site of take and
restriction of commercial fishing).
58. See Roat, supra note 30, at 708-09 (arguing first question focuses on need,
not reasonableness).
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state regulation must be a reasonable and necessary conservation

measure.5 9 While the Court did not entertain the specific meaning
of "reasonable and necessary," it relied on the stipulation of the
parties that the activities of the Puyallup Tribe threatened the exter60
mination of the fish.
Second, in assessing whether the regulation met appropriate
standards, the Court examined the means chosen by the state to
attain the conservation goal. 61 Here, the Court maintained that
state regulations concerning the time and manner of fishing were
62
sound if they sought to achieve the necessary conservation goals.
Finally, under the third inquiry, the Court required that the
regulation be applied in a non-discriminatory manner. 63 Often the
grant of tribal hunting and fishing treaty rights coexists with rights
of non-tribal citizens. 64 Regulation of those rights must apply non65
discriminatorily to tribal members and other citizens.
The Supreme Court recently reaffirmed the "conservation necessity exception" in Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa.6 6 In
that case, several tribal members from the Chippewa Band filed suit
against the State of Minnesota, seeking declaratory relief to retain
certain hunting and fishing rights on their reservation. 6 7 The Supreme Court held that the Chippewa maintained those rights pursuant to an 1837 Treaty. 68 The rights must be exercised in a
manner compatible with the interests of state wildlife regulations
and natural resources. 69 When the interests are no longer compatible and tribal use of natural resources threatens a state's conservation efforts, the interest of the Tribe yields to the interest of the
State: "We have repeatedly reaffirmed state authority to impose rea59. See Puyallup I, 391 U.S. at 401-03 (stating lower court gave no authoritative
answer to question of reasonableness and necessity).
60. See id. at 402 n.15 (referring to stipulation that if defendants kept fishing,
salmon were in jeopardy of extinction).
61. See id. at 401 n.14 (discussing appropriate nature and scope of

regulation).
62. See id. (arguing certain types of regulations permissible).
63. See id. at 403 (discussing equal protection issue when implementing
regulations).
64. See Roat, supra note 30, at 710 (discussing treaties which preserved rights

in common with other citizens).
65. Puyallup , 391 U.S. at 403 (stating any ultimate finding must also cover

issue of equal prtection).
66. 526 U.S. 172 (1999).
67. See id. at 176 (explaining type of relief sought by Tribe).

68. See id. Under the terms of the treaty, the Tribe ceded land to the United
States in exchange for hunting, fishing and gathering rights. See id. at 176-77.
69. See id. at 204 (recognizing that rights must be compatible with state
regulation).
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sonable and necessary nondiscriminatory regulations on Indian
hunting, fishing, and gathering rights in the interest of conservation." 70 Thus, as recently as 1999, the conservation exception from
71
Puyallup remains a relevant consideration for state regulation.
C.

Reconciling Environmentalism with Tribal Sovereignty

Increased environmental awareness in the United States has
coincided with a comparable increase in Native American autonomy over natural resource management on reservations. 72 Environmental groups and states in favor of government regulation argue
that tribal lands account for millions of acres in the United States,
73
which may be suffer environment harm without state regulation.
The tribal response to this concern is that self-regulation "of natural resources and environmental pollution is appropriate for tribal
nations .. . because of the historical association between Native

Americans and 'Mother Earth."'

74

The federal government has recognized the potential conflict
between environmental goals and tribal sovereignty, and has created the American Indian Environmental Office (AIEO) to
strengthen environmental protection on tribal lands. 75 This office
helps tribes coordinate the efforts of the federal Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) with an emphasis "on building Tribal ca-

70. Id. at 205 (citing Puyallup Tribe v. Dep't of Game of Wash., 391 U.S. 392,
398 (1968)).
71. See Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians,526 U.S. 172, 205 (holding conservation exception as proper accommodation of tribal and state interests).
72. See, e.g., Gregory P. Crinion & Tracey Smith Lindeen, Environmental Law
and Indian Lands, 69 Wis. LAw. 14, 14-15 (Sept. 1996) (discussing tribal self-government of environmental affairs). The authors argue: "American Indian tribes are
assuming an increasing role in regulating activities that affect the air, water and
land on tribal reservations. This expanding role results, in part, from efforts of the
tribes to protect tribal lands through regulatory means." Id. at 14.
73. See STRATEGIC PLAN 2000-2005: BuREAu OF INDIAN AFFAIRS U.S. DEP'T OF
THE INTERIOR (2000). The Bureau of Indian Affairs [hereinafter BIA] is located
within the Department of the Interior, and oversees the management of more
than 43,400,000 acres of tribal-owned land. See id.
74. See Stuckey, supra note 6, at 11,206 (discussing tribal sense of responsibility to regulate resources). But see David Rich Lewis, Native Americans and the Environment: A Survey of Twentieth Century Issues, 19 AMER. INDIAN Q. 423-50 (1995) (finding
no Indian consensus on balance between environmentalism and materialism exists). In an attempt to restore an environmental mission, many Native environmentalist groups have been formed, such as Native Americans for a Cleaner
Environment. See id.
75. See Stuckey, supra note 6, at 11,207 (describing office of AIEO).
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pacity to administer their own environmental programs." 76 Since
the 1980s, EPA's goal has been to give tribes authority to make and
enforce their own environmental regulations. 77 EPA has granted
significant power to tribes in the regulation of air pollution, water
78
pollution, solid waste, nuclear waste and natural resources.
Despite EPA attempts to ensure that Native Americans will regulate tribal lands to benefit the environment, state environmental
offices still attempt to impose their regulations on tribes, especially
in the area of natural resources.7t Many tribes turn to the federal
courts to vindicate their federal treaty rights to occupy and use reservation lands free from state regulation."" Under certain circumstances, however, tribes are barred from suing states under the

Eleventh Amendment's sovereign immunity doctrine.8 1
D.

The Eleventh Amendment and Sovereign Immunity

The doctrine of sovereign immunity states that a government
cannot be sued without its consent1 2 This concept was transplanted to America from the English belief that the monarch could
do no wrong.8s3 Shortly after the Nation's founding, the Eleventh
76. See Environmental Protection Agency, availableat http://www.epa.gov/in-

dian/miss.htm (last visited Sept. 14, 2002). This website lists the responsibilities of
the AIEO, emphasizing cooperation between tribes and the EPA. Id.
77. See Stuckey, supra note 6, at 11,206 (claiming tribes are on equal par with
states to regulate environment).
78. See id. at 11,209-12. For example, under the Clean Air Act [hereinafter
CAA] "tribal nations have the authority to regulate air quality on Native American
reservations." Id. at 11,209. Similarly, Congress amended the Clean Water Act
(CWA) to give tribes authority similar to states for the purpose of water pollution
regulation. See id. In the area of solid waste management, tribes may exercise
jurisdiction on reservation lands through appropriate legislation. See id. at 11,211.
79. See, Lewis, supra note 5 (discussing imposition of regulations by state environmental offices). Perhaps because the land and its resources play such an important role in the lives of Native Americans, the use of those resources are
important to environmentally-conscious tribes. See id. Sometimes tribal use of natural resources conflicts with goals established by the ESA. SeeJohnson, supra note
2, at 524 (discussing Endangered Species Act and its impact on Indian tribes); see
also Robert J. Miller, Exercising Cultural Self-Determination: The Makah Indian Tribe
Goes Whaling, 25 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 165, 167 (2002) (discussing uproar by environmental groups over hunting of California gray whale by Makah Indian Tribe).
80. See, e.g., Lauren E. Rosenblatt, Removing the Eleventh Amendment Barrier:Defending Indian Land Title Against State Encroachment After Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe,
78 TEX. L. REV. 719, 720 (2000) (discussing suit brought by tribe against State of
Idaho).
81. For a discussion of the Eleventh Amendment and state sovereign immunity, see infra notes 82-122 and accompanying text.
82. See BARRON'S LAW DICTIONARY 479 (4th ed. 1996) (defining sovereign immunity doctrine as precluding suit against sovereign without sovereign's consent).
83. See, John J. Gibbons, The Eleventh Amendment and State Sovereign Immunity: A
Reinterpretation,83 COLUM. L. REV. 1889, 1895-96 (1983) (discussing original intent
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Amendment was added to the United States Constitution to protect
this concept. 84 The Eleventh Amendment protects states from be-

ing sued by citizens of different states or by foreign countries.8 5 On
its face, the Amendment expresses that states may not be sued by
citizens of other states, but it is silent on the question of whether
sovereign immunity prevents suits by a state's own citizens. 86 The
Supreme Court addressed this issue in 1890 in the case of Hans v.
Louisiana.8 7 In a landmark decision, the Court held that the Eleventh Amendment's sovereign immunity prevented citizens from suing their own states, thus interpreting the language of the
88
Amendment quite broadly.
Over the years, the Supreme Court carved out three notable
exceptions to Eleventh Amendment immunity. 89 First, the Court
held that a state may waive its sovereign immunity in Atascedero v.
Scanlon.9 ° This waiver exception is narrow and is permitted only
of Framers' conception of sovereign immunity). Early writings about the concept
can be found in the Federalist Papers:
It is inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to be amenable to the suit
of an individual without its consent. This is the general sense, and the
general practice of mankind; and the exemption, as one of the attributes
of sovereignty, is now enjoyed by the government of every State in the
Union.
THE FEDERALIST No. 81, at 487 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
84. See Timothy S. McFadden, The New Age of the Eleventh Amendment: A Survey
of the Supreme Court'sEleventh Amendment Jurisprudenceand a Review of Kimel v. Florida
Board of Regents, 27J.C. & U.L. 519 (2000). In 1793, the Supreme Court held that
the Constitution did not protect a state from a suit by a citizen of another state. See
Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793). Chisholm involved a suit by a
South Carolina citizen against the state of Georgia to recover a Revolutionary War
Debt. See id. After that decision, states feared an endless stream of litigation and
hence encouraged quick passage of the Eleventh Amendment to prevent that scenario. Id.
85. U.S. CONST. amend. XI (prohibiting suits against states by citizens of other
states).
86. See id. (noting silence on issue of whether sovereign immunity prevents
suits by state's own citizens).
87. 134 U.S. 1 (1890). Hans brought suit in federal court against the State of
Louisiana, in an effort to collect on state-issued bonds. See id. at 1-3.
88. See Randy L. Meyer, The Supreme Courts Analysis in Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene
Tribe of Idaho: Is The Young Exception to the Eleventh Amendment Inapplicable to Indian
Tribe Claims, 30 U. TOL. L. REv. 131, 136 (1998) (arguing interpretation of Hans as
broadly extending Eleventh Amendment).
89. See McFadden, supra note 84, at 537-52 (discussing three exceptions to
Eleventh Amendment immunity).
90. See Atascedero v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234 (1985) (holding waiver of Eleventh Amendment as exception to sovereign immunity). Scanlon brought an action against a California State Hospital, alleging discrimination in job hiring due to
a physical handicap. See id. at 234. The Supreme Court held that the suit was
barred by the Eleventh Amendment, because the waiver found in the California
Constitution did not specify the State's willingness to be sued in federal court. See
id.

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2003

11

Villanova Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 14, Iss. 2 [2003], Art. 3

266

VILLANOVA ENVIRONMENTAL LAw JouRm.

[Vol. XIV: p. 255

when the state does so expressly and unmistakably. 91 Second, in
Fitzpatrickv. Bitzer,9 2 the Court held that Congress may occasionally
abrogate the Eleventh Amendment through statutes. 93 Fitzpatrick
brought suit against the State of Connecticut alleging a violation of
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 94 The Court permitted the
suit, arguing that when Congress acts pursuant to Section Five of
the Fourteenth Amendment, it may "provide for private suits
against States or state officials which are constitutionally impermissible in other contexts. '95 Here, the suit was permissible because
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was enacted pursuant to Section Five of
the Fourteenth Amendment. 96
After Fitzpatrick, the Supreme Court expanded statutory abrogation to include the Commerce Clause in Pennsylvania v. Union
Gas Co..97 Seven years after Union Gas, the Court reversed itself in
Seminole Tribe v. Florida,98 holding that statutory abrogation did not
extend to the Commerce Clause. 99 Current jurisprudence allows
91. See College Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd.,
527 U.S. 666 (1999). (holding waiver valid if express and unmistakable). In this
case, a Florida state entity, began its own tuition pre-payment program. See id. at
666. College Saving Bank alleged misrepresentation and sued under the Trademark Remedy Clarification Act [hereinafter TRCA]. See id. The Court held that
the suit was barred because TRCA did not validly abrogate the state's sovereign
immunity. See id.
92. 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
93. See id. at 456 (stating that Congress has legislative authority to abrogate
Eleventh Amendment).
94. See id. at 448 (discussing nature of lawsuit).
95. Id. at 456 (noting Congress's ability to provide for private suits against
states when it acts pursuant to § 5).
96. See id. (concluding statutes enacted pursuant to § 5 may abrogate Eleventh Amendment).
97. 491 U.S. 1 (1988). In this case, Union Gas operated a coal gasification
plant in Pennsylvania, which produced tar as a by-product. See id. at 5. The plant
closed in 1950. See id. In 1980, the State of Pennsylvania, along with the EPA,
worked to clean up the remaining tar deposits that threatened the water quality of
nearby waterways. See id. at 6. The United States, under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 [hereinafter CERCIA] sued Union Gas to recover costs. See id. Union Gas filed a third-party
complaint against Pennsylvania, but the district court dismissed the claim based on
Eleventh Amendment immunity. See id. The Supreme Court reversed. See id.
98. 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
99. See id. at 75 (holding that Congress does not have authority to abrogate
immunity under Indian Commerce Clause). The Seminole Tribe sued the State of
Florida arguing that the State failed to comply with the Indian Gaming Regulation
Act [hereinafter IGRA]. See id. at 55. Florida argued Eleventh Amendment immunity, and the Supreme Court agreed, stating that while IGRA clearly expressed
congressional intent to abrogate sovereign immunity, Congress acted beyond a
valid exercise of power. See id. at 58. The Court then overturned its decision in
Union Gas, arguing that Congress may abrogate a state's sovereign immunity only
pursuant to § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. See id. at 72.
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Congress to abrogate a state's sovereign immunity only if it is pursuant to Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment. 0 0
Under a final exception to sovereign immunity announced in
the 1908 decision of Ex parte Young, a citizen may sue a state officer

directly in his or her official capacity.' 0 l In that case, the Minnesota
legislature created a commission to regulate railroad rates. 10 2 The
stockholders of the Northern Pacific Railroad challenged the commission. 10 3 The suit named Edward T. Young, State Attorney General, as defendant, but he argued that the suit was barred by the
Eleventh Amendment's sovereign immunity cloak. 10 4 The Supreme Court disagreed and permitted a suit for injunctive relief
against a state official when the official acts in violation of federal
05
law. 1
While the Ex parte Young exception can avoid the restrictions of
10 6
the Eleventh Amendment, it has been narrowed over the years.
For example, in Edelman v. Jordan,'0 7 the Supreme Court held that
the exception applies only to suits seeking prospective relief. 10 8
The Court insisted that "a federal court's remedial power, consistent with the Eleventh Amendment, is necessarily limited to prospective injunctive relief, . . . and may not include a retroactive

100. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (determining when
Congress legislates pursuant to § Five of Fourteenth Amendment). In Flores, the
Archbishop of San Antonio sued the City of Bournes for violation of the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act [hereinafter RFRA]. See id. at 511. The Court ruled that
Congress's power to abrogate sovereign immunity, as expressed in RFRA, was impermissible because Congress's power under § 5 is remedial only, not substantive.
See id. at 532-36. After Seminole Tribe and Flores, the Court continued its trend of
disallowing congressional abrogation of sovereign immunity in Kimel v. FloridaBd.
of Regents. 528 U.S. 62 (2000). The Kimmel Court held that Congress may not
abrogate state sovereign immunity under the Age Discrimination and Employment
Act [hereinafter ADEA]. See id. at 84. Abrogation of sovereign immunity must
follow from a valid purpose under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, and it is the
role of the courts to determine what that purpose is. See id.
101. See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908); see also McFadden, supra note 84,
at 539 (explaining Ex parte Young).
102. See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. at 127 (discussing scheme of railroad rate
regulation).
103. See id. at 129 (describing nature of action in law suit).
104. See id. at 132 (explaining Young's argument).
105. See McFadden, supra note 84, at 540 (arguing Eleventh Amendment does
not bar suit even when remedy frustrates official state policy).
106. See id. at 541 (recognizing modifications in doctrine).
107. 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
108. See McFadden, supra note 84, at 541 (discussing Court's holding in
Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974)).

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2003

13

Villanova Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 14, Iss. 2 [2003], Art. 3

268

ViLI ANOVA ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. XIV: p. 255

award which requires the payment of funds from the state
treasury." 0 9

In 1997, the Supreme Court decided Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe
of Idaho'10 which further narrowed the Ex parte Young doctrine.' I
The Coeur d'Alene Tribe alleged ownership of the submerged
lands and bed of Lake Coeur d'Alene. 1 2 It brought suit in federal
court against the State of Idaho and various state officials, seeking
declaratory judgment that its use of the lake was exclusive. 113 Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, held that sovereign immunity prevented the Tribe from suing the State of Idaho.' 14 While on
its face the suit would seem to meet the Ex parte Young criteria seeking only prospective injunctive relief, Justice Kennedy argued:
[t]o interpret Young to permit a federal-court action to
proceed in every case where prospective declaratory and
injunctive relief is sought against an officer, named in his
individual capacity, would be to adhere to an empty formalism and to undermine the principle ...

that Eleventh

Amendment immunity represents a real limitation on a
federal court's federal question jurisdiction. The real interests served by the Eleventh Amendment are not to be
sacrificed to elementary mechanics of captions and
15
pleadings.1
After Coeur d'Alene, courts must weigh and balance a state's interests when determining whether to permit a suit to continue
under an Ex parte Young exception. 1 6 In particular, if the suit implicates a "special sovereignty interest," the Eleventh Amendment

109. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 677 (holding remedial relief is limited

to prospective injunctive relief).
110. 521 U.S. 261 (1997).
111. See id. at 287 (holding Ex parte Young inapplicable in certain
circumstances).
112. See id. at 264 (stating alleged tribal ownership of lakebed).
113. See id. at 265 (describing nature of lawsuit).
114. See id. at 287 (finding Ex parte Young exception inapplicable). Early in
the decision, Justice Kennedy noted the "well-established principle" that tribes are
subject to the Eleventh Amendment: "In Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak,
501 U.S. 775 (1991), we rejected the contention that sovereign immunity only restricts suits by individuals against sovereigns, not by sovereigns against sovereigns."

Id. at 268.
115. Coeur d'Alene, 521 U.S. at 270 (recognizing need to limit Ex pante Young

exception).
1'16. See id. at 278. The weighing of a state's interests requires a case-by-case
analysis of the Ex parte Young doctrine. See id. at 280.
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol14/iss2/3
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may bar the suit even if, under Ex parte Young, the suit would have
1 17
been permitted.
Lower federal courts have struggled to determine the effect of
Coeur d'Alene on the Ex parte Young exception. 18 While Kennedy's
majority opinion sought a balancing test to determine whether a
special sovereign state interest overrides Ex parte Young, only Justice
Rehnquist pointedly endorsed the test. 119 Many lower courts have
maintained that Ex parte Young remains valid, and that Coeur d'Alene
changes application of the Eleventh Amendment only in circumstances factually similar to Coeur d'Alene.120 For example, the Ninth
Circuit has argued that it was Coeur d'Alene's unique divestiture of
the state's control over its own lands that made the Ex parte Young
exception inapplicable.

21

IV.

NARRATIVE ANALYSIS

In Timpanogos Tribe, the Tenth Circuit addressed the issue of
whether the Tribe's suit against Utah State environmental officials
was barred by the Eleventh Amendment. 12 2 At the outset, the
Tenth Circuit noted the primacy of determining the sovereign im117. See id. at 287-88. Because the issue in Coeur d'Alene involved navigable
waters, the Court found that this implicated a unique special sovereignty interest.
Id. Hence, the suit was impermissible. See id. at 284.
118. See, MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. Bell Atlantic PA, 271 F.3d 491,
506 (3d Cir. 2001) (citing "confusion" as to scope of Coeur dAlene's special sovereignty interest).
119. See, Meyer, supra note 88, at 150 (stating that plurality of Court pointedly
rejected balancing test).
120. See, AT & T Communications v. Bell South Telecommunications Inc.,
238 F.3d 636, 648 (5th Cir. 2001) (holding application ofExparte Young unaffected
by Coeurd'Alene); see alsoJoseph A. ex rel Wolfe v. Ingram, 262 F.3d 1113 (10th Cir.
2001) (rejecting CoeurD'Alene argument for state welfare programs); CSX Transp.
Inc. v. Board of Public Works, 40 Fed. Appx. 800 (4th Cir. 2002) (holding application of Coeur d'Alene to its facts).
121. See Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians v. Hardin, 223 F. 3d 1041,
1044 (9th Cir. 2000) (giving narrow interpretation of Coeur d'Alene).
122. Timpanogos Tribev. Conway, 286 F.3d 1195, 1198-99 (10th Cir. 2002). The
defendants filed a motion to dismiss on four other grounds, but the Tenth Circuit
declined to review those issues: 1) res judicata; 2) lack of subject matter jurisdiction; 3) failure to join indispensable parties, and 4) laches. See id. Further, the
Tenth Circuit refused to entertain the issue of whether tribal status affected the
Tribe's right to bring an action in federal court, stating: "The crux of the defendants' contention ... is that the Tribe has no federal right on which to base a claim
because it is not a 'federally recognized' tribe." Id. at 1201. The Tenth Circuit
stated that the rights asserted here by the Timpanogos spring from federal treaty
rights. See id. at 1202. Further, the federal government recognizes tribes in a variety of ways for varied purposes. See id. at 1203. The Tenth Circuit concluded that
"the fact that a tribe is not administratively recognized does not affect the tribe's
vested treaty rights." Id.
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munity issue.123 Such an issue forms the basis for a valid interlocu-

tory appeal.124 In evaluating the merits of the sovereign immunity
argument, the Tenth Circuit began with the proposition from Hans
v. Louisiana that the Eleventh Amendment generally prevents citizen suits against states,' 25 Suits against state officials seeking prospective relief may proceed, however, under the doctrine of Ex parte
Young.' 2 6 The Tenth Circuit explained that the Tribe's complaint
here was specifically altered to comply with the Ex parte Young exception at the suggestion of the district court. 127 Given this alteration, the Tenth Circuit held that the amended complaint would
"seek no more than an injunction barring Utah state officials from
prosecuting members of the Timpanogos Tribe from hunting, fishing, and gathering with Tribe-issued licenses on Indian lands."1 28
The complaint would thus place the suit well within the parameters
1 29
of the Ex parte Young exception.
The Tenth Circuit's brief analysis employed a four-part test to
determine the applicability of Ex parte Young 1) is the suit against a
state official or the state itself; 2) is the conduct a violation of federal law; 3) is the relief sought prospective in nature; and 4) does
the suit implicate any special sovereignty interests. 13 0 The Tenth
Circuit, after announcing the four-part test, summarily determined
that the facts surrounding the Timpanogos claim met this test:
It [the claim] is against state officials for conduct that allegedly violates the rights of the Tribe under the Congressional Act of 1864. It seeks only prospective relief that
would not in any way retroactively affect the state treasury.
Finally, considering that the state has no sovereign interests over Indian land ...

the injunction sought implicates

3
no special sovereignty interests.' '

123. See id. at 1199 (noting initial jurisdictional concern of sovereign immunity claim).
124. See id. at 1201 (discussing primacy of interlocutory issue).
125. See id. at 1205 (citing Hans v. Lousiana, 134 U.S. 1, 13-15 (1890)) (arguing that Eleventh Amendment generally bars suit against state by citizens of that

state or another state).
126. See id. (citing Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159-60 (1908)).
127. See Timpanogos Tribe, 286 F.3d at 1205 (noting that original complaint was
broader than Eleventh Amendment would allow).
128. Id. (explaining why. Ex parte Young would apply).
129. See id. (stating that Timpanogos Tribe makes clear case against state
immunity).
130. See id. (citing framework from Elephant Butte Irrigation Dist. v. Dep't of
the Interior, 160 F.3d 602, 609 (10th Cir. 1998)).

131. Id. at 1206 (determining that four-part test from Ex parte Young is met).
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The Tenth Circuit distinguished Coeur dAlene, arguing that the action to quiet title sought in that case was a prohibited form of relief
that triggered Eleventh Amendment immunity. 132 Ultimately, the
Tenth Circuit affirmed the decision of the district court denying
the state officials' motion to dismiss the Tribe's suit under the Eleventh Amendment.

133

V.

CRITIcAL ANALYSIS

The Tenth Circuit recognized that the Eleventh Amendment
issue of sovereign immunity raised by the State of Idaho could prevent the district court from hearing the substance of the Tribe's
claim.1 34 Given the primacy of such an issue, it is surprising that

13 5
the Tenth Circuit's analysis of the issue was brief and conclusory
While the court outlined a "four-part test" for applying Ex parte
Young, it did not illuminate its reasoning behind the conclusion
that the test was met here.1 36 In particular, the third element of the
test required a more rigorous inquiry. 137 The third element asks
whether the relief sought is "permissively prospective relief or analogous to a retroactive award of damages impacting the state treasury." 1 38 The Tenth Circuit, in concluding that the relief sought
here was permissible under the test, stated, "it seeks only prospective relief that would not in any way retroactively affect the state
treasury."1 39 The prospective/retroactive dichotomy, however, is
not so easily distinguished.' 40 Suits that seek prospective relief may
often impose monetary effects on the state treasury.14 1 Merely
pleading prospective relief is not determinative.1 42 In the case at

132. See Timpanogos Tribe, 286 F.3d at 1206 (distinguishing Coeur d'Alene).
133. See id. (affirming district court). In one other recent instance, the Tenth
Circuit gave a cursory review of Eleventh Amendment issues when it decided MCI
Telecommunications Corp. v. Public Service Commission. See Stephanie Chapman, Note,
55 OKLA. L. REv. 175, 196 (2002) (concluding that Tenth Circuit failed to adequately review recent Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence).
134. See Timpanogos Tribe, 286 F.3d at 1199 (recognizing immediate appealability of jurisdictional issue such as immunity).
135. See id.(concluding, without analysis, that test was met).
136. See id. at 1206 (stating that action meets test).
137. See id. at 1205. Parts one and two of the test, asking if the action was

against a state official, and whether the violation was of federal law, were arguably
obvious, and did not require searching analysis. See id.

138. Id. (describing third element of Ex parte Young test).
139. Timpanogos Tribe, 286 F.3d at 1206 (limiting relief sought by tribe).
140. See Richard F. Russell, State Sovereign Immunity and the Pulse of the United
States Supreme Court, 38 TENN. B.J. 29, 35 (May 2002) (recognizing difficulty of determining prospective versus retroactive relief to state treasury).
n
141. See id. (discussing differences set forth in Edelman v. Jordan).
142. See id. (citing to Coeur d'Alene).
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bar, the Tenth Circuit should have analyzed whether the relief
sought, declaring freedom from state hunting and fishing regulations on the reservation, could have implicated the state's
treasury. 14-

Even if a case meets the Ex parte Young test, a non-monetary
claim for prospective injunctive or declaratory relief may nevertheless implicate "special sovereignty interests" that, in turn, may serve
to bar a suit. 144 This additional test was enunciated in Coeur d 'Alene,

and requires a court to weigh special state sovereignty interests
against the interests of the litigant. 145 According to Justice Kennedy in Coeur d'Alene, this requires a "case-by-case" analysis.1 46 The
question in Timpanogos Tribe becomes whether the state's interest in
applying the hunting regulation to the Tribe implicated a special
47
sovereign interest that outweighed the interest of the Tribe.'
The Supreme Court has offered little guidance to lower courts
attempting to identify a state's special sovereignty interest. 148 One
interpretation of the Court's decision suggests that a state interest
"may be articulated as simply as it is under a rational basis test in an
equal protection analysis."1 49 Such a broad test could identify a significant number of state interests. 50 Others argue for a narrow interpretation of a state's sovereignty interest and would include
interests similar to those in Coeur dAlene1 51 Under the latter narrow interpretation, only those issues imposing an obvious intrusion
into state sovereignty, such as a claim to a state's property interest,
143. See Timpanogos Tribe, 286 F.3d at 1206 (concluding without analysis that
relief sought was prospective).
144. See Russell, supra note 140, at 35 (discussing role of special sovereignty
interests in barring suit against state official).
145. For a discussion describing the balancing of special sovereignty interest,
see supra notes 110-17 and accompanying text.
146. See Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene, 521 U.S. 261, 280 (1997) (stating case-by-case
analysis of Young doctrine is evident from precedent).
147. For a discussion of the Tenth's Circuit's conclusory consideration of a
state's sovereignty interest, see infra notes 122-33 and accompanying text. The
Tenth Circuit only briefly addressed the issue: "Finally, considering that the state
has no sovereign interests over Indian land ...the injunction sought implicates no
special sovereignty interest." Timpanogos Tribe, 286 F.3d at 1206.
148. See Coeur d'Alene, 521 U.S. at 280 (stating that application of Young is
"exercise in line-drawing").
149. John H. Clough, Federalism: The Imprecise Calculus of Dual Sovereignty, 35J.
MARSHALL L. REV. 1, 9 (2002) (interpreting Coeur d'Alene decision as allowing "state
interest" to be determined by rational basis standard).
150. See id. (discussing instances in which state's sovereign interest has been
broadly defined under Coeur d'Alene to include control over such activities as admission to bar, certain family relations, and property tax levies).
151. For a discussion of the lower courts' narrow interpretation of the Coeur
d'Alene doctrine, see supra notes 114-17 and accompanying text.
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would prohibit application of Ex parte Young. 152 At a minimum,
consequently, even under the narrow test, lower courts should be
prepared to analyze the nature of a state's claim of special sover53
eignty interests in light of the interests advanced in Coeur d'Alene.'
The question that the Tenth Circuit should have addressed in
Timpanogos Tribe is whether the state's right to regulate hunting and
fishing on reserved lands within state boundaries implicates a special sovereignty interest at least as important as that expressed in
Coeur d'Alene.154 Ordinarily, states will defer to the tribal exercise of
treaty hunting and fishing rights on tribal reservations. 15 5 This deference, however, is not absolute.' 56 In both Puyallup III and Mille
Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, the Supreme Court recognized exceptions to tribal sovereignty in the interest of state conservation
measures. 15 7 The logical intersection of the decisions in Puyallup
III and Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians,combined with the holding in Coeur dAlene, points inevitably to the conclusion that a state's
hunting and fishing regulation may implicate a special sovereignty
interest.15 8 If this is true, the Ex parte Young exception is inapplicable, and the suit against the state is barred under the Eleventh
Amendment.1

59

In order to establish that the state conservation regulation at
issue in Timpanogos Tribe could meet the state sovereignty interest
test from Coeur d'Alene, the state would need to show that the conservation measure meets the requirements from Puyallup I; namely,
that the conservation measure is necessary and non-discrimina-

152. See Clough, supra note 149, at 11 (arguing that sovereign interest in Coeur
d'Alene concerning title to submerged land was obvious intrusion into state
sovereignty).
153. See, Chapman, supra note 133, at 193 (noting that examination of special
sovereignty issue is required by Coeur d'Alene).
154. See, Timpanogos Tibe, 286 F.3d at 1206. While the Tenth Circuit did mention Coeur d'Alene, its analysis fell short of addressing why no sovereignty interests
were implicated. Id.
155. For a discussion of state deference to tribal hunting and fishing rights,
see supra note 43 and accompanying text.
156. For a further discussion of exceptions to tribal sovereign immunity, see
supra notes 41-71 and accompanying text.
157. For a discussion of the Supreme Court's holdings in Puyallup III and
Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, see supra notes 46-71 and accompanying text.
158. See Stuckey, supra note 6, at 11,212 (stating species conservation is compelling state interest which may justify state regulation of Native American lands).
159. See Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene, 521 U.S. 261, 287-88 (1997) (holding Idaho's
sovereign interest in land outweighed tribal claim to land).
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tory. 160 Absent such a showing, the conservation measure is presumed unnecessary, and the compelling state interest disappears. 161
VI.

IMPACT

The Tenth Circuit's Ex parte Young analysis in Timpanogos Tribe
failed to adequately consider the requirements of the Supreme
Court's decision in Coeur dAlene.162 Other lower courts faced with
similar challenges to the Ex parte Young exception have examined
the underlying sovereignty interests involved to determine if Coeur
163
d'Alene would bar the suit against a state official.
In a climate of greater tribal autonomy over the regulation of
natural resources on reservations, state challenges to tribal environmental sovereignty are likely to increase.1 64 At the same time, recent Supreme Court jurisprudence has afforded greater protection
for states seeking immunity under the shield of the Eleventh
Amendment. 65 Although lower courts have applied the Coeur
d'Alene doctrine narrowly, the rights at issue in Timpanogos Tribe arguably fit within that doctrine. 1 66 After Coeur d'Alene, states looking
for ways around tribal control of environmental resources could argue a compelling sovereign interest in conservation under Puyallup
I and Puyallup Ill.1 67 Tribes unable to rebut the conservation ex-

ception will face serious obstacles to the exercise of their treaty
168
rights to hunt and fish.

160. For a discussion of the requirements from Puyallup I, see supra notes 5557 and accompanying text.
161. See Puyallup 1, 391 U.S. 392, 398 (1968) (holding State may not interfere
with treaty rights except to regulate for conservation exception).
162. For a discussion of the requirements from Coeur d'Alene, see supra notes
110-117 and accompanying text.
163. For a discussion of the lower courts' application of Coeur d'Alene, see
supra notes 118-21 and accompanying text.
164. See, Lewis, supra note 5 (pointing to pervasive disputes between states
and tribes); see also Stuckey, supra note 6, at 11,207 (discussing increasing role of
tribes in environmental regulation as evidenced by establishment of AIEO).
165. See Buccino et al., supra note 17, at 16 (stating Eleventh Amendment
jurisprudence threatens to upset federal/state partnership that characterizes modern environmental law).
166. For a discussion of the lower courts' interpretation of Couer d'Alene as a
narrow doctrine applying only to land-related interests, see supra notes 114-17, and
accompanying text. Since the treaty rights at issue in Timpanogos Tribe are related
to land use, they could arguably fall within the narrow exception. See id.
167. For an explanation of the conservation exception under Puyallup I and
Puyallup IlI, see supra notes 46-57 and accompanying text.
168. See, Stuckey, supra note 6, at 11,212 (finding restrictions may be placed
on tribes if hunting interferes with state conservation efforts).
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By failing to adequately address these issues in Timpanogos
Tribe, the Tenth Circuit leaves tribal rights vulnerable to challenges
from states seeking to abrogate treaty rights in the name of state
sovereignty over conservation. 69 In the Coeur d'Alene equation, the
unique sovereignty interests inherently protected by tribal treaty
rights would need to be weighed against state claims for control
over environmental regulation. 170 The presumption of the preemption of state law in the area of tribal treaty rights would weigh
favorably for tribes. 171 On the other hand, the assertion of a valid
conservation measure could weigh favorably for states. 172 By ignoring the post-Coeur d'Alene reality of the Eleventh Amendment, the
Tenth Circuit missed an opportunity to explore the question of
when a state's natural resource regulation might trump tribal treaty
rights, and vice versa.' 7 3 Until courts address the impact of Puyallup
and Coeur d'Alene on tribal suits against states, the right of tribes to
sue states over natural resource regulation remains ambiguous.
Susan R. Fiorentino
169. See id. (noting vulnerability of treaty rights when exercise of rights conflicts with state conservation efforts).
170. See Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene, 521 U.S. 261, 278 (1997) (holding that careful
balance of state interests are needed when determining application of Ex parte
Young doctrine).
171. See Reynolds, supra note 1, at 784 (discussing doctrine of preemption).
172. See id. at 792 (predicting that conservation is valid state regulation preempting tribal treaty rights).
173. For a further discussion of how the Tenth Circuit missed an opportunity
to discuss the balancing of tribal hunting and fishing interests against state conservation interests, as required by Couer d'Alene, see supra notes 154-61 and accompanying text.
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